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Abstract 
 
The European railway sector is undergoing dramatic changes. During the still ongoing 
liberalization process most vertically-integrated railway operators have already been 
“unbundled”. The shift from integrated to disintegrated companies coupled with the 
introduction of competition – so far in freight, but as of 2010 also in international passenger 
traffic – is having profound implications on the development and deployment of new 
technologies. In addition, within the framework of the Single European Market the main 
stakeholders have now to work under the constraint of interoperability. 
 
The paper examines railway standardization processes within an interoperable environment. 
So far, the railway sector has a strong history of national standards development. In the area 
of signalling, the result and current situation is therefore a patchwork of poorly interoperable 
systems. The paper builds on a case study of the development and deployment of a core 
signalling system – the European Rail Train Management System (ERTMS) – to illustrate the 
difficulties to coordinate a standardization process in such a deregulated environment. The 
paper questions whether, in the framework of the emerging technological and institutional 
environment, the current governance of rail standards is suited to the EU‟s objectives of a 
competitive railway market. 
  
Through the introduction of ERTMS the paper discusses the role of the new European Rail 
Agency (ERA) as the locus for coordinating the ERTMS standardization process. It makes 
recommendations as to which actor(s) is/are best suited to govern the standardization of such 
highly complex and interdependent technical systems. 
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Introduction 
 
Like most network industries, European railways are subject to intense liberalization 
pressures. During the past decade, most countries have launched into the separation of train 
operations, infrastructure management and path allocation. In addition, and sometimes in 
parallel, they have introduced competition in a number of market segments (e.g. freight and 
regional lines) and are preparing for the future opening of the international passenger market2. 
  
The overhaul of the European railway market has, by-and-large, been driven by the 
Commission‟s 2001 Transport White Paper (European Commission, 2001). But the 
Commission‟s attempt to create a competitive “Single Railway Market” has met with a 
number of difficulties. Railway systems have historically been run at the national level 
through vertically-integrated monopolistic and state-owned companies. Not surprisingly, 
these different national railway networks have been designed under different operating rules 
and philosophies. This resulted in a lack of interoperability which can be observed in different 
types of track gauges, different types of electrical power supply, differences in speed control, 
train safety technologies, as well as different job profiles for drivers. Today, crossing national 
borders remains impossible for many trains for technical and operational reasons. For the time 
being, the solution to running international trains across different railway systems lies in 
multiplying the on-board train equipment so that the locomotives can cross borders, as well as 
training drivers to conduct trains under different operational rules3.  
 
The European Commission‟s ambition to foster a competitive pan-European railway market 
rests partly on improving the interoperability of the heterogeneous national railway systems.  
To this end, it has been encouraging the development and deployment of a harmonized 
railway management system – the European Rail Train Management System (ERTMS) – 
across Member States.  Despite similar external pressures, like the on-going liberalization 
process of the European railway market and the creation of a pan-European Railway Agency 
(ERA), national policy responses to and actual deployment of ERTMS differ widely and 
remain well below expectations. The European Commission (EC) resorted to appointing a 
special ERTMS coordinator to speed up and extend the current deployment of ERTMS.  
 
The paper presents a case study around ERTMS, one of the most important technological 
development in railway‟s recent history and a cornerstone in the EC‟s interoperability 
objective.  It builds both on secondary literature – ERA reports, stakeholder publications 
(CER, EIM, UNIFE, RUs, TOs, etc.) – and on high-level interviews conducted with the main 
stakeholders in the railway sector (ERA, railway associations, railway undertakings, 
infrastructure managers and national transport ministries). It is part of a larger research project 
dealing with the co-evolution between technologies and institutions. 
 
The paper argues that the successful transition from a regulated to a liberalized environment 
causes and necessitates institutional transformations that go well beyond the creation of a 
regulator or the licensing of new entrants. This is particular true of most networked systems 
with a strong technical/technological component. Fulfilling the market liberalization objective 
– measured by the creation of a competitive and performing market – actually requires the 
alignment of technology and institutions. 
                                                 
2 The 3
rd
 railway package proposed the opening of international rail passenger transport by 2010. 
3 Multi-system locomotives already ensure reliable rail transport (e.g. the Thalys between France and Germany 
or the Cisalpino between Italy and Switzerland). 
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There has been a recent resurgence of interest in understanding how the interplay of 
regulation and institutions applies to network industries and more particularly how it affects 
performance (Andres, Guasch et al., 2007)4. In Europe, the renewed interest can in large part 
be explained by the fact that many utilities – including railways – used to be monopolistic and 
vertically-integrated. Driven by market liberalization the unbundling of activities (e.g. 
infrastructure management and train operations) creates a fundamentally different dynamic in 
infrastructure sectors. So far, most of the discussion about the liberalization of railways 
industries in Europe has centered on measuring aspects of economic performance (Spychalski 
and Swan, 2004; Jupe and Crompton, 2006)5. For instance, the issue of railway 
interoperability received scant attention6. Grillo (2002) argues that networks will never be 
perfectly interoperable. He proposes that interoperability should be defined as “the result of 
an assessment of a combination of technical, organizational and regulatory factors”. Similarly 
Rothengatter (2006), while acknowledging the technical element of interoperability, 
highlights the importance of the associated rules of control and management. Even if the 
technical effectiveness of particular railway technologies is largely covered in the technical 
literature, the issue of system-wide performance (i.e. the economic-societal-technical nexus) 
of the railway system is seldom discussed. 
 
One strand of literature has introduced a promising theoretical framework to analyze this 
relationship between technologies and institutions and how it affects the performance in 
network industries. In their seminal paper on coherence/co-evolution between institutions and 
technologies, Finger, Groenewegen et al. (2005) distinguish between three categories of 
infrastructure performance:  economic performance, public value, and technical integrity. 
Economic performance is further divided into price efficiency, dynamic efficiency and system 
efficiency7.The main argument put forward by Finger, Groenewegen et al. is that ensuring 
satisfactory functioning of any infrastructure requires coherence between the technical and 
institutional governance – both technical and institutional coordination are ensured via 
centralized, decentralized or peer-to-peer coordination mechanisms8. The notion of “co-
evolution” between institutions and technology can appear counter-intuitive9. On one side 
technology tends to be market-driven, un-predictable and evolving rapidly.  On the other side 
institutions tend to be “government-driven” (or government-laden) and to exhibit strong path 
dependency – making them prone to a relative inertia. It is precisely this opposition that 
creates a tension and potential for failure in the development and deployment of a new 
technology. It is this tension which impacts the performance of networked systems. 
 
While applying their theory to the electricity and air transport sector, the model proposed by 
Finger et al. remains at a relatively high level of abstraction. In a subsequent article Künneke 
and Finger (2007) argue that, in the era of liberalization, certain critical technical functions 
need to be supported by suitable institutional arrangements in order to safeguard a satisfactory 
                                                 
4 They argue that the structure, institutions, and procedures of regulation matter for infrastructure sector 
performance. 
5 Even there, the measure of railway performance is too often reduced to punctuality! 
6 In an early paper (Nijkamp, 1995) had called for European cooperation to create interoperable networks. 
7 Dynamic efficiency is understood as the ability of the economic system to stimulate and initiate innovations 
that enhance productivity. Public value incorporates the idea of consumer and public interest whereas technical 
integrity is understood as the capacity of a system that is in some kind of distress, to resist or adapt to this 
situation in order to maintain an acceptable level of performance. 
8 More precisely, the degree of coherence between the technical and the institutional coordination of a network‟s 
major functions – interconnection, interoperability, capacity and system management – determines performance. 
9 For a discussion on the concept of co-evolution in large systems, see (Schneider and Werle, 1998). 
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technical functioning. They call for the alignment of technological and institutional regimes 
into a coherent framework, which is not too far from Von Tunzelmann (2003) calling for a 
generalization of interrelationships between technological and organizational change over the 
longer term – in his argument, the network alignment is suggested as a means for bringing 
about the co-evolution of governance and technology in development processes. 
 
Theoretically, the paper borrows from historical institutionalism (HI). The railway sector is 
particularly well suited to a historical institutional analysis since it is strongly driven by 
government/institutional policies – most European governments consider railways as a public 
good. It also exhibits a strong tendency to path-dependency. Several authors have used HI as 
an analytical lens to study the sector (Dunlavy, 1992; Lodge, 2002; Dobbin, 2004). For 
example, the study of the reform of British and French railway regulation (Lodge, 2003) 
shows that the structure of the political-administrative nexus centrally shaped why particular 
policy options were selected while others were neglected. As noted above, the paper draws on 
a second body of literature investigating the relationship between technology and institutions 
and its impact on performance10.  
 
In the first part we review the European efforts at creating a single rail market, introduce the 
notion of interoperability, and sketch out a brief history of ERTMS. The second part of the 
paper questions whether the current European institutional arrangement is well suited to 
develop, deploy and maintain a pan-European standard in a liberalized railway market. 
Particular attention is given to the role of ERA in the deployment of ERTMS. 
 
 
Part I – Towards a Single European Railway Market 
 
In 1991 the European Union (EU) started a reform program to make railway industry more 
economic and efficient (Directive 91/440). The program had three major components:  
separate railways from the State and establish them as commercial undertakings, divide 
monopolistic (infrastructure) from contestable (train operations) railway activities and 
regulate networks to prevent abuse. The EU pushed its agenda through a number of railway 
packages. A first legislative package dealt with organizational separation, licensing regimes 
for railway undertakings and regulation of infrastructure. It was followed in 2004 by a second 
package aimed mostly at legal and technical integration; it included the establishment of a 
railway agency (ERA) and the passing of rail safety regulations11. In November 2007, the 
European Parliament and the Council of Transport Ministers adopted the legislative proposals 
of a third package consisting of measures relative to market opening for international rail 
passenger services, rail passenger rights and obligations as well as the certification of train 
drivers.  
Interoperability 
The adoption of these three legislative packages aims at creating a competitive European 
railway sector. However experience from the liberalization of other network industries (e.g. 
electricity or telecommunication) has shown the negative effects of insufficient access to the 
network on the competitive situation in the respective sectors. Not surprisingly, one of the 
greatest challenges in the liberalization of Europe‟s railway market is ensuring the non-
discriminatory and transparent access to the network and other infrastructure facilities. One of 
                                                 
10 See Finger et al.. 
11 There is a time lag between the adoption of a railway package at the EU level and its implementation in the 
different countries. See Table 1 for transposition of EU railway interoperability into national legislations. 
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the central elements facilitating access to a networked system – and thus making competition 
in the market possible in the first place – is technical interoperability.  
 
In the European railway context interoperability has been mandated by two EU Directives12. 
The first one (Directive 96/48/EC) was passed in 1996 and only concerned the interoperability 
of the trans-European high-speed rail system. The second one (Directive 2001/16/EC) applied 
to lines within trans-European transport networks and to the rolling stock operating on these 
lines.  These directives formally define interoperability as “the ability of the trans-European 
rail system to allow the safe and uninterrupted movement of trains which accomplish the 
specified levels of performance. This ability rests on all the regulatory, technical and 
operational conditions which must be met in order to satisfy the essential requirements”. A 
further step towards interoperability was achieved through the passing of the second railway 
package in 2004 – a Directive for the harmonization of safety requirements and certifications 
that were different in all Member States, and a regulation for the creation of a European 
Railway Agency (ERA) for Safety and Interoperability13. The need for such an agency arose 
from the magnitude, the scope and the nature of the problems that the European railway 
system faces in a liberalized business environment. 
 
Table 1: EU railway interoperability legislation implementation in selected EU countries 
Interoperability Directives NL DE BE FR ES IT 
Directive 96/48/EC 1999 1999 2000 2001 2000 2001 
Directive 2001/16 2003 2004 2003 2005 2003 2004 
Source: Compiled from EU website on interoperability http://ec.europa.eu/transport/rail/countries/index_en.htm 
Note: Directive 96/48/EC deals with high speed rail and Directive 2001/16 deals with the trans-European 
conventional rail system. Implementation was required by April 2003. 
 
In order to achieve the objectives of these directives, technical specifications for 
interoperability (TSIs) were initially drawn up by the European Association for Railway 
Interoperability (AEIF), which acted as the joint representative body defined in the directive 
before the creation of ERA14. The working method established to produce the required 
technical harmonization consists of defining the necessary minimum in terms of each sub-
system, by entrusting a joint representative body (ERA) with the task of preparing Technical 
Specifications for Interoperability (TSIs). The interoperability directives put into place a 
system for conformity assessment against technical specifications for interoperability (TSIs), 
the placing into service of subsystems, and the placing of interoperability constituents onto 
the market. The roles of the key actors and bodies are established such as notified bodies, 
contracting entities and supervisory authorities15. Further, the directives mandated the 
                                                 
12 Directive 96/48/EC of 23 July 1996 (OJ L235 of 17 September 1996) and Directive 2001/16/EC of 19 March 
2001 (OJ L 110 of 20 April 2001).The Interoperability Directive 96/48/EC Article 4(1) required that the trans-
European high-speed rail system, subsystems and the interoperability constituents including interfaces meet the 
essential requirements set out in general terms in Annex III to the Directive. The essential requirements were: 
safety, reliability and availability, health, environmental protection and technical compatibility. The Directive 
allowed that the essential requirements may be applied to the whole trans-European high-speed rail system or be 
specific to each subsystem and its interoperability constituents. 
13 Directive 2004/50/EC of 29 April 2004 (OJ L164 of 30 April 2004) modified Directives 96/48/EC and 
2001/16/EC: it updated the provisions of these two directives in line with the directive on safety and the role of 
ERA and stated the principle of interoperability for the whole railway system, to be implemented progressively 
as of 2008. 
14 Two EC decisions formally mandated ERA for developing technical specifications for interoperability 
(Commission decision C(2007) 3371 final – 13 July 2007 and C(2006) 124 final – 9 February 2006. 
15 This section draws on (Kema-RTC DHV B.V., 2007: 10). 
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development of TSIs which establish the technical interoperability requirements which 
subsystems and interoperability constituents shall meet16. The Commission has adopted in 
May 2002 the TSI for 6 subsystems – maintenance, control and command, infrastructure, 
energy, rolling stock, operation. Most TSIs published so far concern high-speed rail17. 
However, according to (Kema-RTC DHV B.V., 2007) confusion about the definition of 
interoperability and other reasons make the application of the TSIs seemingly difficult and 
create openings to continue to apply national approaches (TSIs are full of back doors). Further 
development of the TSIs, aimed at improving their completeness and ease of application is 
needed to reduce this trend for national solutions.  
 
The European railway interoperability is based on a triple-layer structure: 1) the two 
interoperability directives (Interoperability Directives 96/48 and 2001/16), 2) the technical 
specifications for interoperability (TSI) and 3) European specifications, e.g. CENELEC or 
ETSI norms (see Fig 1.). Directives and TSIs once approved are mandatory and have to be 
complied with. European standards are voluntary documents unless directly referred to in 
Directives or TSIs. In practice the Interoperability Directives added a layer – the TSIs – 
between the EC Directives and the EN standards. 
 
Figure 1: From directives to standards in the European railway sector 
 
Source: ??? 
Note: Directives and TSI‟s once approved are mandatory and have to be complied with. European standards are 
voluntary documents unless directly referred to in Directives or TSI‟s. Operational rules are usually mandatory 
History of the European Rail Traffic Management System (ERTMS) 
For a variety of reasons, different automatic train protection (ATP) systems have emerged 
                                                 
16 For some ETCS is viewed as an add-on project financed by the EC (and wanted by the sector) which found its 
way into the TSI to make sure it could be enforced. 
17 In April 2008 the Commission has adopted a Decision modifying Annex A to Decision 2006/679/EC of 
March 2006 concerning the TSI relating to the control-command and signaling subsystem of the trans-European 
conventional rail system and Annex A to Decision 2006/860/EC of 7 November 2006 concerning the TSI 
relating to the control-command and signaling subsystem of the trans-European high speed rail system. 
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across Europe at different times. These systems were, by-and-large, incompatible and not 
interoperable with each other (Bloomfield, 2006). While most of European railways protect 
their rail traffic by means of intermittent automatic train running control systems, the 
operating philosophy of these systems frequently differs considerably from one country to 
another (resulting for example in speed restrictions). This has left no option but to switch 
from one control systems to another on cross-border traffic (e.g. by equipping locomotives 
with multiple systems), or, as happens in most cases, to change the locomotive and the driver.  
As early as 1991 the European Institute for Railway Research (ERRI) began examining the 
idea of a new European train protection and train control system (Project name A200) on 
behalf of the International Union of Railways (UIC)18. From 1990 to 1996/7 most work took 
place at the functional and technical level – basically among the railways19. During this 
“study and specification phase” a so-called ERTMS users group (EEIG) was created in 1995 
by the German, French and Italians – later it was extended to the Spanish, the Dutch and 
British. Industry joined in 1996 via a consortium of signaling suppliers (EUROSIG). The 
second phase saw the development of the first products as well as testing and homologation. 
The third and most recent phase has been concerned with the standardization and actual 
deployment of the technology. In 2000, the standardization partners (represented by all 
participating railways in the UIC , the ERTMS Users Group and Europe's leading rail 
engineering companies grouped together in UNISIG), signed an outline agreement for the 
introduction of a standardized, interoperable train control and protection system (i.e. with the 
aim of completing the ERTMS specifications). Member states agreed to publish these precise 
specifications in the form of a Commission resolution, thus creating a provisional legal and 
planning framework.  
Table 2: Phases of ERTMS project 
 Studies and 
specifications 
1989-1997 
Final specifications 
1998-2004 
Roll-out 
2004-2008 (till 2020) 
Technical level  Class P to Class 1 SRS 
SRS 2.2.2 and 2.3.0 
Work on 3.0.0 
Institutional level Directive 96/48/EC Directive 2001/16/EC Directive 2004/50/EC 
Main stakeholders EEIG, ERRI, EUROSIG 
UNISIG, Railways, 
CENELEC, AEIF 
ERA, Railways 
Emphasis Engineering Politics Financial 
Source: Adapted from UIC and Winter (2007) and personal interviews. 
 
For the first 10 years of its life ERTMS was politically driven by the European Commission 
trying to force the national railway companies to work together to deliver the technology – 
organizations such as the UIC tended to be politically rather than business-oriented in their 
decision-making. Without strong political influence, ERTMS could have stopped at the end of 
the first phase (three levels of applications were described in a document called project 
declaration; there was also quite a deep elaboration of a first set of technical specifications). 
Individual countries played an ambiguous role. For instance, the roll-out of high-speed lines 
(dictated by domestic political agendas) created conflicts with harmonization and 
standardization work (e.g. SRS specifications). At the same time, one has to recognize that 
these same countries (e.g. Spain and Italy) managed to maintain the necessary overall 
momentum through their high-speed projects. 
                                                 
18 Train control is an important part of any railway operations management system. 
19 Ironically, the task now is to remove some of the early ERTMS options because they create mismatches and 
to be much more precise about the specifications. 
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Over the years ERTMS moved from its initial objective to improve technical interoperability 
in the field of ATP to bringing together multiple streams of harmonization and standardization 
activities in the areas of signaling and command/control, telecommunications and traffic 
management. It consists now of two complementary systems:  a communication standard 
(GSM-R20) and a European Train Control System (ETCS). Initially, ERTMS was primarily 
safety and technology-orientated. More recently, work on the third component – INNESS – 
has been undertaken looking into feasibility of implementing pan-European traffic 
management systems.  
 
Today, the ERTMS project serves three purposes: 1) improved interoperability of the trans-
European rail network – not only inside the EU borders, but also foreseeing the longer term 
integration of Central and Eastern European networks; 2) the creation of a single market for 
procurement, leading to a significant reduction in equipment costs and an improvement in the 
competitive position of the railway supply industry on world markets; 3) the optimization of 
rail operations on a European-wide scale. As such, it plays a critical role in Europe‟s railway 
market liberalization plan. While the ultimate goal of ERTMS is to ensure the interoperability 
of cross-border transport, its “side-benefits” are numerous: better and safer working 
conditions for train drivers, savings for railway undertakings – different signaling systems for 
various networks are no longer required in the cab – and increase the capacity utilization of 
the existing rail network – up to 20% increase of capacity through higher speeds and reduced 
headways. 
Deployment of ERTMS in Europe 
Under the current migration strategies proposed by the European countries, full deployment of 
ERTMS – and thus interoperability at the European level – is likely to take several years if not 
decades. For example, Switzerland who leads deployment in Europe aims to complete the 
equipment of its network with ETCS level 1 (with limited supervision) earliest by 201221. The 
rest of Europe is looking towards 2020. In the meantime, the technology will keep evolving:  
in other words, the long deployment horizon of ETCS poses an additional challenge to 
maintaining and improving a pan-European standard. According to the British office of Rail 
Regulation (2004) the deployment of ERTMS faces three problems are threefold: 1) 
overcoming the initial cost barrier of fitting large numbers of vehicles, so that the network 
performance and infrastructure cost reduction benefits can be realized22, 2) managing the 
major operational change that such a system represents, and 3) overcoming the “reliability 
trough” that a new system of this kind almost inevitably goes through, before long term 
benefits start to be delivered.  
 
In reality, a far larger number of technical and operational issues plague a widespread 
development of ERTMS in Europe (see appendix 1). This can partly be explained by the fact 
that the various stakeholders within the railway sector – infrastructure managers, train 
operators, equipment suppliers but also government agencies – hold different views and 
                                                 
20 The GSM-R radio system exchanges information between the ground and the locomotive. 
21 This project is known as ETCS-Netz. According to estimates, the equipment with ETCS level 1 of the entire 
Swiss network (more than 3‟000 km) should cost CHF 350 million. Equipment with level 2 would run in billions 
because interlockings need to be changed. 
22 Cost estimates for the system remain vague and countries have different migration strategies. Some of the old 
functioning systems are still a long way from the end of their useful lifetime. As lines and the locomotive both 
have to be equipped with ETCS, trains will in the interim period have to provide service on the established 
system and in parallel have to adopt ETCS. The EC estimates that the cost of retrofitting would be significantly - 
up to 80% - higher than the cost of directly installing the systems when constructing new track or upgrading 
track. 
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respond to different incentives. For instance, modularization was not a priority for industry 
(market protection) during many decades. In addition, because of the financial loses incurred 
on the pilot lines, suppliers are not very motivated to make more research work for new issues 
of specifications – as long as they have not recuperated their “investment”. Safety people have 
shown resistance to ETCS level 1 with limited supervision (the migration path chosen by 
Switzerland and Germany) – they want full supervision. Not surprisingly, top management of 
incumbent railway operators does not always heartily support the ERTMS project because of 
its essential contribution to market opening23. For many of them, ERTMS is “just another 
system” not yet able to replace the current system24. Railway undertakings (RUs) have to deal 
with a number of version upgrades and backward compatibility issues. In addition, for freight 
operators, the business case is not as clear as for international passenger transport. The control 
of standards is in the hands of industry and of infrastructure managers. RUs are weak when in 
comes to standardization: 1) historically IMs were in charge, 2) they are new in the game and 
they have to find their role. RUs have to deal with a complex system which used to be taken 
care of by IMs; in addition they have to deal with maintenance issues. RUs haven‟t yet 
realized they have to take part in the development of ERTMS since part of the responsibility 
is being put on the train. In other words, ERTMS is no longer a black box for the TOs (it 
requires maintenance and configuration management) even if with ERTMS, responsibility is 
shifted from the engine driver to the system. 
 
In summary, the path to a single European rail market is fraught with difficulties. Despite 
efforts from the EC to push for interoperability via several directives, the deployment of 
ERTMS remains limited. Railway companies were used to operating in monopolistic markets 
and driving the evolution of railway systems at a national level, in cooperation with 
designated industries and full support from national authorities. They now have to prepare for 
a competitive environment in which supra-national directives dictate the evolution of the 
railway market. 
 
 
Part II – Developing a pan-European railway standard in the era of liberalization 
 
A number of studies (de Tilière, Emery et al., 2003; de Tilière and Hultén, 2003) have pointed 
out that a shift regarding innovation has taken place in railway systems during the early 1990s. 
Before that leading countries mainly had a national market with a national operator working 
with a main manufacturer for a defined scope of supply (i.e. market share between national 
manufacturers according to key technologies). National industrial policies were always in the 
background and the relation between operators, institutions and governments were very tight 
(see Dobbson 1994; Quinet 1999; de Tilière 2001)25. The change agents for the system 
architecture were the duo operator-manufacturer. The manufacturer proposed technological 
specifications according to the degree of innovative solutions required by the operator (at the 
system level). Except for international trains, there was neither real need nor demand for 
trans-border standardization. One could even argue that standardization was seen as a threat 
by suppliers – the potential economies of scale realized by the suppliers being offset by rents 
extracted from their captive clients. 
 
                                                 
23 At the same time, with investment cycles that are in many cases around 30 years, railway undertakings 
remain supplier-dependent.  
24 There is currently no mechanism for ERTMS migration built in the standard. 
25 Unsurprisingly, national industrial policies played a key role in the development of rail innovations. 
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The turn of the 1990s saw the end of this “national rail market” equilibrium. Supranational 
legislations started to impose new rules on domestic jurisdictions. For example, procurement 
rules imposed by the World Trade Organization now prevent the past practices of contract 
study allocations. Efforts at market liberalization at the European level also created a 
fundamentally new environment with different actors operating under different power 
relations – the most obvious example is the vertical separation of infrastructure management 
from train operations.  
 
Some ERTMS standardization issues 
While ERTMS was supposed to be a major step in fostering the creation of a single European 
railway market, the difficulties in standardization and the disappointing level of deployment 
questions what type of institutional setting could best enhance the changes for achieving a 
truly interoperable European railway market. In fact, the question of standardization has much 
larger implications. Some of the major stakeholders in the ERTMS ecosystem have recently 
voiced their interest into exporting the ERTMS abroad. The International Railway Union 
(UIC) and suppliers (grouped under UNIFE) are showing interest in fast-growing markets 
such as China or India. Adoption of ERTMS as a global standard, instead of a 
regional/European one, would put additional barriers to the temptation of national railways to 
customize their train management systems. However, it would most likely require re-thinking 
the current standardization and harmonization processes. 
 
For a start, it is important to recognize that standardization of ERTMS takes place in a 
complex institutional setting making coordination an important issue (see Figure 2). A 
number of institutional measures were taken in this direction. In order to alleviate the 
coordination issues, the EC established the European Railway Agency (ERA)26. Attempts to 
improved coordination issues were made by the signing of  Memorandum of Understanding 
(MoU) in March 2005 between the EC and the railway industry (i.e. UNIFE, infrastructure 
managers and railway undertakings) to promote the cohesive and coordinated deployment of 
ERTMS in general and ETCS in particular. The railway industry undertook to assist Member 
States in the preparation of national plans for the deployment of ERTMS and the Commission 
in its work of consolidating these national plans into a European plan. The Commission 
expects the railway industry to collaborate fully on preparing studies for working out, in 
particular, the costs of migration to ETCS in the main corridors of the trans-European network. 
A second MoU on the cooperation between ERA and the European Standards Organisations 
(CEN, CENELEC and ETSI) was signed in May 200727. The Memorandum is aimed at 
establishing a cooperative relationship between the standardisation activities for the railway 
sector and legislative initiatives. It also aims at clarifying the relations between ERA and the 
ESOs regarding the political and technical framework for cooperation for European 
Standardization in the field of railways. Among others it will improve the specifications for 
interoperability. This agreement is part of a larger effort to ensure cost efficient and effective 
use of resources to better deliver European Standards and other European standardization 
products more efficiently in order to support market innovation, achieve both a coherent 
approach to standardization in new areas including converging technologies and a consistency 
                                                 
26 EC Regulation n° 881/2004. 
27 Directive 98/34 recognizes three European Standardization Bodies: CEN, CENELEC and ETSI. TC256 is 
responsible for all railway mechanical standards, CENELEC TC9X for railway electrical standards and ETSI for 
telecommunication standards. Consensus-based working groups of technical experts and stakeholders are 
drafting European standards, called the “European Norms” (ENs). The main output of European standardization 
is the harmonization of technical specifications in the European Union. 
 11 
in standards development28. These high-level agreements will help pave the way for a gradual 
establishment of an integrated European railway area.  
 
Figure 2: ERTMS ETCS Ecosystem (without GSM-R) 
Source: Adapted from Querzè (2007) and personal interviews. 
Note: The Article 21 committee is responsible for the development and application of the interoperability 
directives. ERA ensures the Change Control Management (CCM) of the ERTMS specifications. Established in 
1999, the European Signaling Industry (UNISIG) is a technical body established by six companies for writing 
ERTMS/ETCS technical specifications. EIM, established in 2002, counts 12 infrastructure managers. It is a 
designated representative body within the ERA led ERTMS CCM process. EIM established an MoU with the 
ERTMS Users Group for technical support (CER has an identically worded MoU). EIM and CER jointly 
developed proposals for a methodology of evaluation of changes and for future funding (specifications, 
operational rules, testing and consolidation, site testing). The ERTMS Users Group is a European Economic 
Interest Group (EEIG) constituted by the Railway Administrations of France (RFF), Germany (DB), Italy (RFI), 
Spain (ADIF), The Netherlands (ProRail), United Kingdom (Network Rail) and Sweden (Banverket) plus SBB 
(Switzerland) as cooperating Partner. Under the aegis of the EC and of ERA, the member railways are working 
in co-operation with EIM, CER and UNISIG for the harmonization of the technical specifications and of the 
operational regulations of ERTMS. The role of National Safety Authorities role is defined in art 16.2 Directive 
2004/49: a) authorizing the bringing into service of the structural subsystems constituting the trans-European 
Network […] and c) supervising that the interoperability constituents are in compliance with the essential 
requirements […]. 
 
                                                 
28 CEN and CENELEC agreed to establish a European Standardization System Group tasked with achieving 
more streamlined rules for the development of European Standards, with particular attention to the involvement 
of all stakeholders, and to create a high-level mechanism to solve the technical issues that arise from the 
standardization of emerging and converging technologies. 
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The issue of coordination questions who should be involved at all in the standardization 
process. For instance, hundreds of change requests have been made for the next STS release. 
Even if the common corridor approach should help alleviate the rising number of change 
requests, one can seriously question why organizations which haven‟t yet built an operational 
line are allowed to come up with change requests in the first place.  
 
Coordination is also necessary at the TSI level. For example, the need for an amendment to 
the TSI came after a study, carried out by manufacturers in early 2007, revealed that certain 
ambiguities in the specifications had not been interpreted in exactly the same manner for 
certain projects already in operation as well as for projects about to be put into operation. 
These ambiguities meant that, in certain cases, trains equipped by different manufacturers 
could potentially behave differently in the same situation. ERA worked on the basis of 
„Change Requests‟ (CRs) drawn up by the rail sector, in particular by the manufacturers. The 
consolidation of version 2.3.0 of the ERTMS specifications that will be brought about by the 
latest amendment is a crucial step needed before moving on to the planned version 3.0.0 of 
the system requirements: without this consolidation, it would not have been possible to 
guarantee that „version 3‟ trains could run on „version 2.3.0‟ lines29. 
 
Figure 3: Specification and development of 3.0.0 products 
 
Source: Adapted from Gillan (2007) 
 
Not surprisingly, coordination is also (even more) needed in the deployment phase of the 
technology since further standardization takes place in parallel. A number of elements 
emerged related to the standardization of ETCS emerged from the study of deployment in 
Switzerland (Laperrouza, 2008). First, ETCS is much more related to operational than to 
technical aspects. As a result, standardization (or harmonization) of operational rules will be 
as important as pure technical interoperability. While the publication of a European rulebook 
is an effort may be commended if won‟t probably be the solution to all the problems. For 
instance, experts drafting operational rules may not have the knowledge about the national 
differences – overlaying ETCS on existing systems (i.e. with level 1) can only have a national 
solution but never an interoperable solution with driver exchange. One often hears that ERA‟s 
work on operational rules and on SRS is too theoretical and has no relationship to applications. 
Second, in the words of a senior engineer, “you can only find all failures with a lot 
(thousands) of runs”. The lessons from the Olten-Luzern pilot line have been instrumental in 
                                                 
29 The ERTMS standard version SRS 2.2.2 was completed by an EC decision in April 2004. These SRS 2.2.2 
specifications have been included in the directive 2002/731/CE related to the Technical Specification of 
Interoperability (TSI) for the European High Speed Network. 
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the successful deployment of the two commercial lines30. The test period allowed the operator 
to adjust its ERTMS migration strategy. Similarly, experiences gained from Corridor A will 
be very useful for the other corridors (as a common system). For example, a rulebook of 
applications for Corridor A could serve as a legal document at the EU level. Third, the further 
development of ETCS (and in particular SRS 3.0.0) is jeopardized by the losses incurred by 
equipment manufacturers for the deployment of the two lines. In the past, error correction 
happened via suppliers and finding a solution minimizing the impact on contract and timing 
of commercial opening of the line: this no longer possible – the solution to locally optimize 
with your supplier may not be the right one for the rest of the network even if the contracts are 
still managed by individual railways with individual suppliers – there is no economic reason 
to force them to change this way of behaving. For sure, the increase of commercial projects 
will diffuse know-how and reduce interoperability issues. Similarly, operational rules will 
slowly get harmonized through the running of international trains along corridors. 
 
Another significant problem is the long time needed by the European Standardization Bodies 
to deliver a European standard. This can take longer than 5 years, and in some cases even up 
to 10 years. Some vital TSIs may take more than 20 years to implement. The TSI approval 
process often remains national in scope and outlook. Many TSIs, such as the HS & CR RST, 
still lack the new or amended standards to make EU-wide homologation possible and depend 
upon annexes in the interim. This can inhibit the mutual recognition of test results making 
multi-system approval slow and expensive. This development time is indeed far too long 
when compared to the development of the TSIs, which are both legally binding and 
technically detailed documents. The long development time of European standards has in the 
past reduced significantly the number of standards available to support the achievement of the 
TSIs. Hence in order to ensure that the TSIs can be implemented within reasonable 
timeframes, they now contain highly detailed specifications within annexes to the TSIs. This 
leads to the TSIs being larger and more technically detailed than originally foreseen. 
 
Finally, standardization takes place in parallel to the railway market‟s liberalization which 
involved major re-definition of the stakeholders, including at the institutional level31. For 
instance under AEIF, responsibilities were clear: the railway sector was in charge of technical 
proposals while politics would give their formal approval. Nowadays, ERA has taking over 
the full responsibility. The railway sector acts only in a supportive function (represented in 
working groups). There are no sector representatives anymore in the Article 21 Committee. 
In the market, operators (RU/IM) are running shorts on resources and expertise for working in 
parallel for national standardization bodies, CEN/CENELEC/ETSI and TSI on top of keeping 
update of UIC leaflets
32
. At the same time, the supply industry cannot bear any more the high 
cost and time consuming procedures to respond to fragmented legislation and standardization. 
 
 
 
                                                 
30 The trial included 59 units of rolling stock operating over a 32 km route. With 140 trains per day, the trial 
represented more than 60‟000 train runs (about 2 million km). 
31 The history of ERTMS revealed the importance of coordination between the numerous stakeholders already 
during the technical phase. 
32 The UIC publishes leaflet – prepared and drafted within the expert groups of the UIC Forums and Platforms – 
about infrastructure, technology or operations. The leaflets are revised at the request of operators (RUs/IMs) 
resulting from the needs of operation and linked to other standards. They are kept updated as a knowledge base 
for the UIC members and for supporting the process of the elaboration of TSI and EN (CEN/CENELEC), ISO, 
COTIF, OSJD, etc. Leaflets 73 deal with signaling and interlocking (e.g. adaptation of safety installations to high 
speed requirements, ERTMS/ETCS). 
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The European Railway Agency (ERA) 
Coming in the footsteps of the European Association for Railway Interoperability (AEIF), 
ERA was set up to help create an integrated railway area by reinforcing safety and 
interoperability33. Its main task is to develop economically viable common technical 
standards and approaches to safety, working closely with railway sector stakeholders, national 
authorities and other concerned parties, as well as with the European institutions. 
 
The Commission has mandated ERA to perform certain activities under Directives 96/48/EC 
and 2001/16/EC. This includes: 1) preparing the review and updating of TSIs and making any 
recommendations to take account of developments in technology or social requirements (e.g. 
those who indicate the exact format of the messages which have to be exchanged between the 
track and the train); 2) contributing to the development and implementation of rail 
interoperability – ensure that the TSIs are adapted to technical progress and market trends and 
to the social requirements; 3) monitoring progress with the interoperability of the railway 
systems; 4) examining from the point of view of interoperability, any railway infrastructure 
project. It is expected that these measures will gradually create an open market for rail 
products and systems, create true operational rail interoperability at a European level, and 
reduce the high costs and burdens currently being experienced from the perpetuation of 
specific national technical solutions and systems.  
 
In practice, the Agency also acts as the system authority for ERTMS34. The two main axes of 
ERA as system authority are: 1) configuration and quality control which includes repository 
of all specs, quality review, cross check, consistency and gap identification and 2) system  
evolution and change management which includes baseline planning, system version 
management and backward compatibility. The EC will also be able to ask the agency for 
assistance in the evaluation, as far as interoperability is concerned, of projects eligible for 
Community financial support. As such, ERA plays a central role in the current and future 
technical development of ERTMS.  
 
Discussion 
The fact that ERA is considered as the system authority does not reduce conflicts of interests 
within the ERTMS ecosystem. In the case of the standard‟s evolution process, which is under 
ERA‟s responsibility, there has been an attempt by ERA (led by the ERTMS unit manager) to 
take the lead in the next standard release via the creation of a working group. The attempt 
failed due to a general blockage of the stakeholders. The appointment of a European 
coordinator to facilitate the coordinated deployment of ERTMS in general and of the ETCS 
signaling system in particular is an attempt to bridge the gap between ERA‟s technical and 
political work, and the actual deployment. The coordinator‟s role consists facilitating the 
preparation of coherent and economically viable national deployment plans (through 
corridors) and pinpointing any problems in the implementation of these plans (European 
Commission, 2005). In a sense, it proves the current inability of the institutional setting to 
have ERA act as the sole agency in charge of ERTMS. Moreover, coordinator‟s mandate is 
more geared towards short-term success (deployment via corridors) than towards long term 
sustainability (standards). In practice, ERA finds itself in a situation where it plays both a 
technical and as political role, which places additional pressure on the agency both from the 
EC and the ERTMS coordinator (Karel Vinck). 
                                                 
33 In September 2006, the European Association for Railway Interoperability (AEIF) officially transferred all its 
documentation to the European Railway Agency. AEIF was the joint representative body mandated by the EU 
Commission to lay down the Technical Specifications for Interoperability (TSIs). 
34 ERA is also in charge of establishing transparent processes to manage the ERTMS system changes. 
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While the technical competence of ERA is not in question, this cannot be said of the current 
institutional arrangement which leaves ERA devoid of real powers. ERA does not have any 
regulatory powers. It only submits opinions and recommendations to the European 
Commission35. In other words, it has no decision power. Second, the gap between technical 
coordination and actual deployment is hardly filled by ERA. The “reality of corridors” never 
reaches ERA. In order to minimize transaction costs, ERA doesn‟t work with individual 
suppliers but representative organizations, e.g. UNIFE, UNISIG. There are too many filters 
between the reality (projects) and ERA, namely the various organizations (EIM, CER, UNIFE, 
etc.). Moreover, all stakeholders may not be on the same footing. Member States are 
historically so close to infrastructure managers that suppliers and train operators might be 
disadvantaged. Third, the standardization process itself poses a problem – going back and 
forth between ERA and Member States. For time being ERA doesn‟t have a “carte blanche” 
to modify specific texts36. However there a possibility to say “we Member States trust that 
you do the right thing” and by 2008 TSI can make specific reference to documents which are 
published by the agency itself, a way to skip this complete approval. ERA is also working 
with representatives (suppliers) to write down a legislation imposing them what to develop, a 
sign that the agency is establishing its power. Last, investment decisions are still made at the 
local and national level which distorts incentives. One therefore ends up with very good 
interoperability inside one country.  
 
ERA‟s task is made difficult by the fact that most railway undertakings are just contemplating 
moving away from their existing signaling systems – very often ETCS is overlaid over an 
existing system as a migration tool rather than replacing an existing signaling system. This 
obviously has consequences on the motivation of the stakeholders to take part in the 
standardization process. ERA is also partly struggling because it has the mandate to maintain 
the specifications in a state that is proper for delivering interoperability but nobody is satisfied 
with the proposed solutions. It is easy with technical details to try to really find your own 
solution without reflecting on what would really we the impact in the longer term and on the 
wider acceptance of the system. 
 
In summary, the ERTMS standardization process requires power, of which ERA is currently 
devoid since it is “technically” only allowed to make recommendations. In addition, the newly 
created agency has to operate in a landscape previously ruled by countries. More broadly, one 
central question is whether the current standardization process for ERTMS best serves the 
objective of interoperability. The EC wants technical and operational interoperability. In 
practice, this can only be guaranteed by ETCS level 2 and 3. Too frequent changes of “soft” 
versions must be avoided, which moreover pushes for expensive “hardware” modifications most 
of the time (cf. example of PCs and « Windows syndrome »). The current problems may be due 
to the relative youth of the agency itself as well as to the large scope of the ERTMS project. 
ERA is struggling with the first instances of dealing with a European railway system that must 
be considered as one entity. 
 
Coen and Thatcher (2007) argue that the EC and national regulators maintain controls over 
European regulatory networks (ERNs). The study of ERTMS leads to a similar conclusion: 
while ERA is not a regulatory agency per se, it plays, together with the other railway 
stakeholders (industry associations and their members), a strong regulatory role but only to a 
                                                 
35 It may also send technical opinions to the European Commission or Member States‟ Committees. 
36 For some ERA is “manipulated” by the EC and lacks autonomy. 
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certain point. It therefore finds itself in a weak position with a limited set of powers and 
strong oversight.  
 
A number of questions remain open. First, what explains that, unlike most other European 
network utilities (like telecommunication or electricity and gas), the railway sector does not have 
a European Regulators Group? Second, is ERA a hybrid solution between a sectoral agency and a 
European regulator towards which the EC wants to go in order to restrict the delegation of power 
(formal decision powers are with Art. 21 Committee)?  Third, does the current institutional 
framework – and the creation of ERA – offer the optimal design to the technological and 
competitive shifts taking place in the railway sector?  
 
Conclusion 
 
In the past, national railway systems were much more isolated. Technologies and institutions 
pertaining to the sector tended to be naturally integrated. Governments usually owned and ran 
a single railway company which in turn was linked with a preferred supplier. There was a 
tendency to solve technical issues without consulting other stakeholders. As a result, each 
European country went about developing its own national railway system architecture 
resulting in fairly strong technical system boundaries. This led to a high degree of 
interoperability of railroad traffic at the national level but very dissimilar railway philosophies 
between countries. The resulting lack interoperability can be seen in technical aspects (e.g. 
gauges, energy systems) as well as in operational rules. At the beginning of the 1990s the EU 
opted for the creation of a competitive railway sector. To do so it has passed numerous 
directives aimed at liberalizing the railway market (e.g. through the unbundling of railway 
activities). Keeping with the principle of subsidiarity European countries have adopted a variety 
of paths to approach the mandated de-regulation. 
 
One central characteristic of networked systems is the need for technical interdependence or 
compatibility. As a result, making the European railway sector more competitive can not rely 
solely on an economic approach. Measures need to be taken to guarantee an interoperable 
railway system across Europe. A cornerstone in establishing such a European-wide 
technically interoperable railway system lies in the signalling system. The EU together with a 
number of stakeholders has spent the last 20 years in developing a pan-European control and 
command system (ERTMS) which should allow a train to drive from Sweden to Sicily 
without changing the train set. This implies solving the technical interoperability challenge 
and finding a way to harmonize the different railway philosophies. 
 
On one hand, standardization and harmonization initiatives are necessary given the political 
and economic objectives of liberalized markets. On the other hand, market liberalization 
warrants the unbundling of market players which makes standardization and harmonization 
efforts much harder. The difficulties faced by the new created European railway agency 
(ERA) in standardizing ERTMS highlight well the need to align technology and institutions.  
The task is made even harder since it is taking place in an environment moving from 
cooperative agreements to competition in international traffic. At the same time, the bottom-
up approach to deal with technology harmonization (from national rules to international rules 
to international agreements) has been reversed (from TSI to European standards to national 
rules). It also serves as a reminder that, as in other utilities, sequencing of liberalization 
matters. While the liberalization of the European railway market was aimed at increasing its 
competitiveness, making train and track work together on a given project in practice seems to 
be harder now than before infrastructure management and train operations were unbundled. In 
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the case of ERTMS one could go as far as arguing that the EU went the wrong way by 
pushing for unbundling before achieving technical harmonization.  
 
In addition to the question of sequencing, the study of the deployment of ERTMS in 
Switzerland (Laperrouza, 2008) has highlighted the importance of proximity and close 
cooperation between actual projects and all the stakeholders involved.  Only an integrated 
ecosystem of actors can ensure the successful deployment of ERTMS. As the current 
deployment levels of ERTMS shows in the rest of Europe, the mere existence of ERA, the 
availability of safety rules and the interoperability directives are necessary, but not sufficient, 
conditions for seamless cross-border rail services in the Internal Market. By the same token, 
interoperability should not be reduced to the much more simplified concept of technical 
compatibility. The question of further harmonizing operational rules and philosophies on a 
European level remains at the center of the creation of a single rail market (Di Pietrantonio 
and Pelkmans, 2004). Standardization goes further than simply resolving technical issues. The 
real challenge for the European railway sector will be to make sure that the emergent 
institutional framework remains coherent with the technologies it aims to develop and deploy. 
At the end of the day, the most relevant measure of “full interoperability” and therefore of system 
performance will be the number of trains equipped with a single control and command signalling 
system that cross borders. 
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Appendix 1: Deployment of ERTMS Level 2 
 
Table 3: Summary of ERTMS Level 2 in operation (trackside projects) 
 
Commercial 
operations 
Length RBC SRS 
Trains in 
operations 
Type 
Comments 
BE L4 HSL March 2008 35 km 2 2.3.0 n.a. HSL Alstom; 300 km/h 
CH Lötschberg December 2007 35 km 1 2.2.2 108/day M Thales; 4 interlockings 
CH Mattstetten-Rothrist July 2006 45 km 1 2.2.2 270/day M 
Alstom; 250‟000 km /month with an average delay below 30s 
per week per train; 2 min headway; 15 types of trains 
DE Berlin-Halle/Leipzig December 2005 145 km 4 2.2.2 n.a. ? Thales; 200 km/h 
IT Rome-Naples December 2005 216 km  2.2.2 12/day HSL Alstom-Ansaldo; 300 km/h, 30 trains equipped; 5 min headway 
IT Torino-Novara February 2006 84 km  2.2.2 12/day HSL Alstom-Ansaldo, 300 km/h, 30 trains equipped; 5 min headway 
NL Betuwe June 2007 107 km 3 2.3.0 0/day F Alstom; 4 types of locomotives 
NL HSL-Zuid March 2008 45 km 2 2.3.0 0/day HSL Siemens-Thales; 300 km/h 
Source: Adapted from de Tilière (2007) and International Technical Committee (2008) 
 
Table 4: Summary of ERTMS Level 2 under test (trackside projects) 
 Test start Length SRS Type Comments 
BE L3 HSL n.a. n.a. 2.3.0 HSL Alstom; Bomardier 
ES La Sagra-Toldeo November 2006 21 km; 1 RBC 2.2.0 HSL Thales 
ES Lerida-Barcelona June 2007 176 km; 4 RBC 2.2.0 HSL Thales 
ES Madrid-Lerida May 2007 470 km; 5 RBC 2.2.0 HSL Ansaldo; commercial service in September 2007; 320 km/h 
ES Madrid-Valladolid 2007 184 km; 3 RBC 2.2.0 HSL Thales 
ES Cordoba-Malaga 2007 155 km; 4 RBC 2.2.0 HSL Invensys 
FR Vaires-Baudrecourt June 2007 300 km  2.3.0 HSL Ansaldo; commercial service without ERTMS 
IT Milano-Bologna n.a. 182 km 2.3.0 HSL Ansaldo 
IT Milano-Novara n.a. 40 km 2.3.0 HSL n.a. 
NL Amsterdam-Utrecht n.a. 30 km; 2 RBC n.a. Mixed n.a. 
Source: Adapted from de Tilière (2007) and Kema-RTC DHV B.V., RINA et al. (2007)
 19 
Bibliography 
 
Andres, L., Guasch, J. L., et al. (2007) Do Regulation and Institutional Design Matter for 
Infrastructure Performance.  World Bank:  
Bloomfield, R. (2006) 'Fundamentals of European rail traffic management system (ERTMS)', 
The 11th IET Professional Development Course on Railway Signaling and Control 
Systems, June. 
Coen, D. and Thatcher, M. (2007) Network Governance and Multi-level Delegation: 
European Networks of Regulatory Agencies: Cambridge Journals Online. 28: 49-71. 
de Tilière, G. (2007) Industry experience with ERTMS level 2 trackside. UIC Conference. 
Bern. 
de Tilière, G., Emery, D., et al. (2003) Managing Systemic Innovations in Rail Systems: The 
Case of ERTMS Technology. Swiss Transport Research Conference. Ascona. 
de Tilière, G. and Hultén, S. (2003) A decade of change in the European Rail market; 
Influence on Innovation and R&D: Toward a new equilibrium in the railway sector. 
First conference on Railroad industry structure, competition & investment. Toulouse, 
7-8 November 2003. 
Di Pietrantonio, L. and Pelkmans, J. (2004) The Economics of EU Railway Reform. Bruges 
European Economic Policy Briefings. 
Dobbin, F. (2004) 'How Institutions Create Ideas: Notions of Public and Private Efficiency 
from Early French and American Railroading', L'Année de la Régulation, 8: 15-50. 
Dunlavy, C. A. (1992) 'Political structure, state policy, and industrial change: Early railrod 
policy in the United States and Prussia', in S. Steinmo, K. A. Thelen and F. H. 
Longstreth (eds), Structuring politics : historical institutionalism in comparative 
analysis. Cambridge [England] ; New York: Cambridge University Press. pp. xiii, 257 
p. 
European Commission (2001) White Paper submitted by the Commission on 12 September 
2001: "European transport policy for 2010: time to decide". COM(2001) 370 final. 
European Commission (2005) Communication from the Commission to the EU Parliament 
and the Council on the deployment of the European rail signalling system 
ERTMS/ETCS. COM(2005) 298 final. 
Finger, M., Groenewegen, J., et al. (2005) 'The Quest for Coherence Between Institutions and 
Technologies in Infrastructures', Competition and Regulation in Network Industries, 6 
(4): 227-259. 
Grillo, P. (2002) 'Major strides towards the interoperability of the trans-European high speed 
rail 
system', Rail International, 9: 2-7. 
International Technical Committee (2008) 'ERTMS/ETCS views and experiences', IRSE 
NEWS. Issue 133: 2-6. April. 
Jupe, R. and Crompton, G. (2006) '"A deficient performance": The regulation of the train 
operating companies in Britain's privatised railway system', Critical Perspectives on 
Accounting, 17 (8): 1035-1065. 
Kema-RTC DHV B.V. (2007) Rail interoperability & safety. Transposition of legislation and 
progress on the field  
Kema-RTC DHV B.V., RINA, et al. (2007) Survey of safety approvals for the first ERTMS 
implementations. 
Künneke, R. and Finger, M. (2007) 'Technology Matters: The cases of the liberalization of 
electricity and railways', Competition and Regulation in Network Industries, 8 (3): 
303-335. 
 20 
Laperrouza, M. (2008) Deploying a pan-European railway standard in the era of 
liberalization: Lessons from the introduction of ERTMS in Switzerland. Building 
Networks for a Brighter Future. EURNEX - ZEL 2008. Zilina, Slovak Republic. 
Lodge, M. (2002) On different tracks: designing railway regulation in Britain and Germany. 
Westport, Conn.: Praeger. 
Lodge, M. (2003) 'Institutional Choice and Policy Transfer: Reforming British and German 
Railway Regulation', Governance, 16 (2): 159-178. 
Nijkamp, P. (1995) 'From missing networks to interoperable networks : The need for 
European cooperation in the railway sector', Transport Policy, 2 (3): 159-167. 
Office of Rail Regulation (2004) Signalling review. Initial consultation on review process. 
Rothengatter, W. (2006) 'Issues of Interoperability in the European Railway System', 
Intereconomics - Review of European Economic Policy, 41 (6): 306-311. 
Schneider, V. and Werle, R. (1998) 'Co-Evolution and Development of Large Technical 
Systems in Evolutionary Perspective', in C. E. García and L. Sanz-Menédez (eds), 
Management and Technology. Vol. 5. Luxemburg: European Comission. pp. 12-29. 
Spychalski, J. C. and Swan, P. F. (2004) 'US rail freight performance under downsized 
regulation', Utilities Policy, 12 (3): 165-179. 
UIC and Winter, P. (2007) Global Perspectives for ERTMS. Paris: Union Internationale des 
Chemins de Fer. 
von Tunzelmann, N. (2003) 'Historical coevolution of governance and technology in the 
industrial revolutions', Structural Change and Economic Dynamics, 14: 365-384. 
 
 
